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U.C.A. 76-4-203 defines 'Criminal Solicitation'. It provides the following: 
a) An actor commits criminal solicitation if with intent that a felonv be 
committed, he solicited, requested, commanded, or offered to hire, or 
importuned another person to engage in specific conduct that under 
the circumstances as the actor believed them to be would be a felony 
or would cause the other person to be a party to the commission of a 
felony. 
(Emphasis Added) 
It continues in paragraph two: 
(2) An actor may be convicted under this section only if the solicitation 
is made under circumstances strongly corroborative of the actor's 
intent that the offense be committed. (Emphasis Added) 
U.C.A. 76-2-103 provides: 
A person engages in conduct intentionally when it is his 
conscious desire or objective to engage in the conduct or cause the 
result. 
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JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT 
Authority for said appeal is found within the confine of Rule 26 of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; Utah State Constitution Article 1, Section 12; 
Utah Code Annotated Section 77-1 6(g); and Section 78-2-2 (i) Utah Code 
Annotated. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Does the exploration or mere talk within the proscription of the 
'Solicitation' Statute? Is there a requirement for an agreement to a specific course 
of action? 
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STATEMENT OF CASE 
The defendant herein is alleged to have committed the offense of Solicitation 
to Commit Aggravated Assault (a Third Degree Felony). This is an appeal from 
the order of sentencing. The defendant was committed to the Utah State Prison 
for a period not to exceed five (5) years. 
The State alleged that the defendant, with the intent that a felony be 
committed, he solicited, requested, commanded, or offered to hire, or 
importuned another person to engage in specific conduct that under the 
circumstances as the actor believed them to be would be a felony or would cause 
the other person to be a party to the commission of a felony, said felony being to 
intentionally cause serious bodily injury to another (Aggravated Assault). The 
alleged victim is his ex-wife. 
The defendant challenged this accusation by seeking a dismissal of the 
information. The defendant entered a "Sery Plea" to the charge, reserving his 
right to challenge the conviction on appeal. Defendant argues that the State's 
evidence is insufficient to support a conviction. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
The State's accusation is based on conversations between Phillip Meza and 
James Magarrell. Both Meza and Magarell were both incarcerated in the Utah 
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County Jail work release program. Mr. Meza testifies that Magarrell contacted 
him on August 6, 2000 (T. 6 L. 14) to discuss 'solving a problem' with his ex-wife. 
In the discussions that ensued between August 6, 2000 through August 8, 
2000, Meza and Magarell discussed a list of possible conduct including: 
a) Homicide (T. 8 L. 9), 
b) Having her disappear (T. 27 L. 9-18), 
c) Having her sexually assaulted (T. 39 L.l), or 
d) Simply do nothing (T. 40 L. 5-8). 
No agreement existed as a specific or concrete course of action. No 
decision was reached. T.38 L. 2-24. 
After a brief jailhouse discussion on August 6, Mr. Meza advised he had a 
friend (T.9 L. 12) who would assist in solving the problem but it would cost 
$10,000.00 (T. 27 L. 20). However, no further conversations should occur and 
nothing would be 'put in place' (T.40 L. 2-4/ T.36 L.15) until Magarell had 
provided the following: 
1-a photo of his ex-wife, 
2-addresses for her work and home, 
3- $5,000 cash, and, 
4- keys to car. 
(T. 9 L. 20. /T.29 L. 24/ T. 37. L. 10.) 
None were ever produced excepting a partial address. T. 30 L. 3 / T.30 L. 
25/ T.32. L.24 / T. 41 L.ll . 
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Immediately after the August 6, 2000 meeting, Meza contacted officers at 
the Utah County Sheriffs office (T. 11 L. 11) and attempted to negotiate a deal. 
An agreement was reached and he was paid approximately $420.00 bv the 
Sheriff, given an early release from a jail (9 months) and financial assistance in 
moving. T. 42 L. 24 -T. 43 L. 14 / T. 44 L 13 / T. 54 L. 17. Under the Sheriffs 
instructions, Mr. Meza was then instructed to contact Magarrell. He did and a 
meeting was then to be set up at a Motel 6 in Lehi, Utah. T. 13 L. 13/ T. 14 L. 8. 
The meeting was monitored by audio and video cameras. Officers listened in an 
adjacent room. T. 13 L. 22. 
Mr. Meza testified as well as Deputy Sheriff Monson and the alleged 
victim's father. The Motel 6 video was played to the Court and is included as an 
exhibit. (No transcript was created of the video's dialogue but it is included in 
the exhibits.) 
The meeting occurred on August 8, 2000. The meeting is summarized as 
follows: Meza asked Magarell if he had what he needed: 
1. Photos; 
2. Addresses; 
3. Keys; and 
4. Cash. 
Magarell told him no—he "doesn't have shit". T. 32.d L. 1-10/ T.32 L 24/ 
T. 36 L17-25. See Video. There was to be no meeting and nothing was to be put 
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in motion unless the money and information was delivered. T.40 L.2. Magarell 
said he was not ready to 'go7. T.32 L.ll. Magarell told Meza that he can't give 
him 'shit todav'. T. 36 L. 15. T. 33 L. 17-21 T. 33 L. 12-14 / T. 35 L. 6. 
Magarell told Meza that he needed more time to get everything together. 
T.32 L.10-17. Meza did not know when the money would be paid but he knew 
nothing was going to happen for two weeks. T. 36 L.ll / T.33 L.17. 
Magarell advised Meza that he did not want anything to happen until 
Magarell said it was a 'go' (T.35 L.20 / T.35 L. 20) and, even then, he may call up 
and tell him to do nothing. T.40 L. 5-8. Meza suggested some surveillance begin 
on the ex-wife. This was not done. T.34 L.10. 
Magarell told Meza that he (Magarell) would set the timetable but he may 
choose to call the whole thing off. T. 40 L. 5-8. Meza attempts to push the deal to 
a conclusion. See Video. (Arguably, Meza is expects to be released from jail if he 
gets Magarell to say the magic words. Magarell has not provided the data, 
money or photos. Magarell refuses to give him any authority to go ahead.) 
Meza again asked Magarell if he had any of the items he needed to put 
this in motion. Magarell stated again no. T. 32 L. 1-10. T. 32 L. 24 / T. 36 L. 17-25. 
Meza asks for the ex-wife's name, her address, where she worked, her 
work schedule, a description of her car, and license plate number. Meza told 
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Magarell that if you give me that kind of schedule today and he will go to work 
on it today. No schedule was produced. 
Meza pushed further and asks for a key to the car. Magarell delaved 
again and told him that he will deliver the key when he delivers the monev. 
Meza pushes on and Magarell communicates a partial address of her 
home (1000 East, Orem) with no northern or southern quadrant given. T. 54. L. 
14. See Video. He described the office where she works and gives them a 
personal description of her, the car she drives but partially misstates the year of 
the Isuzu Trooper. T. 30 L. 10-12. 
The video shows that Magarell is writing down some information on a 
piece of paper but never gives it to Meza. (The video documents Meza getting a 
piece of paper from a desk to have Magarell write down the information. 
Magarell refuses. He, however, writes down some data on paper he has retrieved 
from his (Magarell) attache but does not give it to Meza.) Deputy Monson 
listening via a transmitter from another room confirms the video version. T. 54 L. 
14. Nothing is given to Meza. T.54 L. 14. 
Regarding her employment address, Magarell seemingly looked through 
a phone book to obtain an address but does not give one. The videotape 
suggests that he could not find the address. See Video. It is, however, easily 
found within the white pages. 
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Meza pushed for information but Magarell delays Meza again, telling him 
that he would get the information to him by dropping it in his car window. This 
was not done either. T. 32 L. 24. Magarell confirms that no money would be paid 
for weeks, (T. 33 L. 12-14 / T. 35 L. 6) and nothing was to happen until money 
was paid. T. 36 L. 15. T. 33 L. 17-21. Magarell delays Meza by asking for 
additional weeks and fails to drop the information in the Meza's car. T. 39 L. 10-
13 / T. 40 L. 2. 
Further, the issue of what was to be done is incomplete and undecided. 
There was no agreement regarding any specific course of conduct. T. 37 L. 17 L. 
24. Magarell is undecided. T. 41 L. 14. Magarell also tells Meza that if it comes 
down to i t he may call and tell him to do nothing. T. 40 L. 5-8. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE ARE NOT MET 
For this conviction to stand, the State must show that the defendant had 
agreed with another to commit an aggravated assault on his ex-wife. He must 
have desired and intended the assault to have taken place. Intent is not 
presumed. 
There must be some element beyond mere verbal expression or desire. 
The evidence here is lacking. 
1) There was no agreement for a specific result (conduct). The ideas 
explored ranged from a violent death, death with a rape, a simple disappearance, 
an assault (turning her into a vegetable) or nothing—calling the whole thing off. 
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2) Neither information nor payment was given to initiate anv conduct. 
The information and money was a condition precedent to any conduct occurring. 
No photos, no money, no key were given. 
ARGUMENT 
APPLICABLE CASE LAW & TREATISES 
Due to the dangers in defining anticipatory offenses which punish talk, 
expressions, and ideas, Model Acts and the legislature have specifically required 
strongly corroborative evidence (i.e. some conduct) demonstrating an 
individual's intent (U.C.A. 76-4-203 (2)); for there is a legitimate hesitancy to 
punish ideas and bad thought without accompanying conduct. U.C.A.76-1-104 
(2). 
Joking, inquisitorial comments or even an exploration of an idea or a bad 
thought does not justify a conviction. We do not punish bad thoughts no matter 
how horrific they may be. State v. lohnson, 821 P.2d 1150 (Utah 1991); State v. 
Weldon, 6 U.2d 372, 341 P.2d 353 (1957). There must be some element beyond 
mere verbal expression. State v. Rivers (Maine 1993) 634 A.2d 1261; U.C.A. 76-1-
104 (2). 
However, in defining anticipatory offenses (attempts, solicitation, 
conspiracy to commit) certain dangers arise as we seek to stop such conduct 
before it achieves results. Yet legislatures and courts have been reluctant to 
imposed criminal sanctions on bad thoughts without some strong corroborating 
evidence accompanied by specific conduct (a substantial step/active or positive 
action). 
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Recognizing such hesitancy and dangers, Courts have required the State 
to prove that there wras some point in time at which the defendant had induced 
another to commit a specific offense, with the intent to cause the commission of a 
specific crime and the defendant believing and intending that the crime take 
place. Schwenk v. State of Texas, 733 SW2d 142 (Tex Crim. App. 1987). 
The entertainment of the idea of committing the crime is insufficient. 
Talking about it is insufficient. Mere talk or even preparation is not enough. 
State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150 (Utah 1991); State v. Weldon, 6 U.2d 372, 341 P.2d 
353 (1957). The mere inquiry into whether someone would commit a crime is not 
sufficient. The mere asking of another to commit a crime is not sufficient. You 
must have the conscious desire or objective to cause the particular result. There 
must be some concrete course intended; the solicitor must intend to achieve that 
result through the participation of another. It must be the defendant's intent that 
the crime be committed. 
Lafave & Scott's Treatise on Criminal Law provides: 
Although the crime of solicitation might be defined quite simply as 
asking another person to commit an offense, this does not adequately 
reflect either the mental element or act, which must exist in order for the 
crime to be completed. 
As to the required mental state, none is explicitly stated in the usual 
common law definition of solicitation, and likewise none is expressly set 
forth in several solicitation statutes. However, the acts of commanding or 
requesting another to engage in conduct which is criminal would seem of 
necessity to require an accompanying intent that such conduct occur, and 
there is nothing in the decided cases suggesting otherwise. . . . 
Thus, as to those crimes, which are defined in terms of certain 
prohibited results, it is necessary that the solicitor intend to achieve that 
result through the participation of another. If he does not intend such a 
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result, then the crime has not been solicited, and this is true even though 
the person solicited will have committed the crime if he proceeds with the 
requested conduct and thereby causes the prohibited result. For example, 
if B were to engage in criminally negligent conduct which caused the 
death of C, then B would be guilty of manslaughter; but it would not be a 
criminal solicitation to commit murder or manslaughter for A to request B 
to engage in such conduct unless A did so for the purpose of causing C s 
death. 
Likewise, where the prohibited result involves special 
circumstances as to which a mens rea requirement is imposed, the solicitor 
cannot be said to have intended that result unless he personally had this 
added mental state. (Emphasis Added) 
See Lafave & Scott, Page 489-490. Anticipatory Offense: Parties. 
The Model Penal Code & Commentaries, Part 1 Section 5:02 (1985), 
at page 371, states that it is not enough for a person to be aware that his words 
may lead to a criminal act or even to be quite sure they will do so; it must be the 
actor's purpose that the crime be committed. It is necessary that the term 
solicitation carry some concrete course of conduct that it is the actor's object to 
incite, at page 377. This would be analogous to the provisions of U.C. A. 76-3-
403(2) requiring strongly corroborative evidence of intent. 
Statutorily, U.C.A. 76-4-203 (2) requires as an element of the offense that 
there be the engagement of a specific course of conduct. Here none exists. The 
discussions between Meza and Magarel] ranged from 'nothing to be done' to 
'homicide' with a varying conduct in between (rape to aggravated assault). 
UTAH COURTS. The Utah Courts seem hesitant to support convictions 
upon similar facts. In State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150 (Utah 1991) the Court 
overturned the conviction for Attempted Homicide. The Johnson Court held 
that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had the 
intent to kill or knowledge that her acts would be carried out or would result in 
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the death of her husband and thereby engage in some conduct constituting a 
substantial step toward causing the death of the victim. The evidence identified 
the defendant as purchasing counterfeit 'crank' from undercover officers but 
there was no showing that she attempted to administer the substance. The court 
held, as they did in State v. Castonguay, 663 P.2d 1326 (Utah 1983), that in order 
for the conduct to constitute a substantial step, there must be more than mere 
preparation. The Castonguay Court found that when "we say that a man 
attempted to do a given wrong, we mean that he intended to do specifically it, 
and proceeded a certain way in the doing". The Johnson Court also cited State v. 
Otto, 102 Idaho 250, 629 P.2d 646,647 (1981) wherein the Idaho Court found that 
the purchase of counterfeit crank from an undercover officer does not go beyond 
mere preparation and therefore does not constitute a substantial step. 
See also State v. Weldon, 6 U.2d 372, 341 P.2d 353 (1957), where a 
policeman acting on information that robbery of a Safeway store was planned, 
went with one Robinson to a hotel room occupied by the defendant and another. 
These men were found in the room and each had in his possession a loaded 
revolver. Questioning these men revealed that they were strangers in town and 
that they did not offer any explanation of any proper business or employment in 
the area. They had no explanation for possessing the loaded pistols. Upon being 
confronted, Weldon admitted that his intent was to rob the Safeway store. A 
conviction was obtained for robbery on those limited facts. 
The Supreme Court found the evidence insufficient. The Court ruled that 
there must be independent, clear and convincing evidence of the corpus delicti 
prior to the admission of the statements. 
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The Utah holdings would suggest that there must be something more than 
mere talk and the exploration of an idea. There must be some concrete course of 
action undertaken. Specific criminal intent is an essential element of the charge 
and it cannot be presumed. U.C. A. 76-2-101, U.C. A.76-2-103, State v. Pitts, 728 
P.2d 113 (Utah 1986), State v. Tohnson, 771 P.2d 1071 (Utah 1989). Any 
presumption of intent is constitutionally barred. State v. Turner, 736 P.2D 1043 
(Utah 1987). 
Preparation is insufficient. One must take a substantial step under the 
"attempt'7 statute. Under the solicitation statute, there must be an agreement to a 
concrete course of action with an intended a specific result. 
Other Jurisdictions. Other jurisdictions agree. A specific or concrete 
course of action is mandated. 
In People v. Salazar, 140 Mich. App.137, 362 N.W.2d 913, the Michigan 
Court of Appeals addressed a similar case. There a paid informant was 
incarcerated in the County Jail (as here) on the guise that he was convicted of a 
narcotic offense. The defendant was incarcerated as well. The informant soon 
was on a conversational basis with the accused. Discussions occurred wherein 
the defendant advised that he had an appeal pending and he wished that two 
witnesses in the former trial (police officers) would tell the truth on appeal. The 
informant (Martinez) suggested that he had some connections to make them tell 
the truth as in breaking an arm. Defendant refused the offer and indicated that 
when he took care of them and when he did he would take car of them for good. 
Defendant also said that he had some experience in explosives and that he 
wanted the witnesses to be taken care of by a car bomb. The informant then 
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suggested that he had some connections with friends possessing explosives but 
that thev wanted a 'fair price' for it. 
The defendant then told the informant that cash payment would be 
arranged through a friend. He told the informant that he did not want to meet 
with anybody. A meeting was scheduled but the defendant did not show up. 
Thereafter, the informant asked if the defendant would give him the contract to 
kill the witnesses. Defendant replied affirmatively but kept putting the 
informant off as to specifics. The defendant was convicted at trial and appealed. 
The Salazar Court held that the prosecution failed to prove the element of 
"imminent" action. The defendant did not urge the acts to be done immediately 
The Court held that the evidence did not indicate that anything had gone even 
beyond the preparatory stages, e.g., obtaining explosives, or that the defendant 
intend to immediately proceed to kill either witness. As here, the informant kept 
pushing the defendant for something imminent (a concrete course of action) and 
the defendant kept putting him off. 
The Salazar Court reviewed prior holdings in People v. Owens, 131 Mich. 
App. 76, 345 N.W.2d 904 (1983). In Owens, as here, the defendant was to pay 
one-half of the fee but ultimately paid nothing. In addition, the defendant was to 
give to the undercover officer schedules and photographs of the intended 
victims. As here, none were produced. The Owens court overturned the 
conviction. 
See also State v. Suggs, 453 S.E.2d 211 (N.C. App. 1995), wherein the 
defendant appealed his conviction of solicitation to commit an assault on another 
with a deadly weapon and inflicting serious bodily injury. The defendant (wife) 
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was charged after Bateman confessed to the shooting of the defendant's former 
husband, Suggs, and Bateman told the officers that the defendant hired him to 
kill Suggs and a woman (Johnson) whom Mr. Suggs had been dating. Bateman 
revealed two plans as the State's kev witness; one was to attack Johnson and the 
other was to kill Suggs. Bateman had a series of conversations with the 
defendant, during which she told him about Johnson and the two agreed that 
Bateman would break (Johnson's) face or break her legs for $2,500, which the 
defendant later paid to Bateman. Bateman testified that after four months of 
Bateman stalling over Johnson, the defendant and Bateman agreed that Bateman 
would kill Suggs for $15,000, through a series of subsequent telephone calls 
between Bateman and Suggs. Nothing further was said about the arrangement to 
injure Johnson, and no assault occurred on Johnson. Thereafter, the defendant 
advanced Bateman $2,000 and later gave Bateman a picture of Suggs and drove 
him by Sugg's home. 
The North Carolina Court held that for the defendant to be liable for the 
substantive crime of solicitation but finding the State must prove a request to 
perform every essential element of the crime referencing Johnson. The Court 
held that for the State to prevail it must produce substantial evidence beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant and Bateman contemplated the use of a 
deadly weapon in carrying out the assault on Johnson. There was no evidence of 
how Bateman was to inflict the severe injury on Johnson and furthermore the 
mere fact that the defendant asked Bateman to inflict serious injury on Tohnson 
did not necessarily imply the use of a deadly weapon. The Court contrasted this 
factual scenario to State v. Brown, 67 N.C.App. 223, 313 S.E.2d 183,191 where the 
PAG ) 5 
E 
Court held there was sufficient evidence of a deadly weapon for conspiracv to 
commit felonious assault when the defendant gave his co-conspirator a knife 
before the assault. 
Here as in Suggs, no agreement was achieved as to what assault, if any, 
was to occur. There was no specific course of conduct sought. 
See also U.S. v. Rahman, 34 F.3d 1331 (7th Cir. 1994), wherein the Federal 
Government sought to convict the defendant of solicitation to commit robbery 
and extortion. The factual statement is quite lengthy but relevant to this matter. 
The defendant Rahman had a son and son-in-law who had stolen an entire 
truckload of Christmas novelties. They attempted to sell the load but were 
unsuccessful. They contacted another person by the name of Haik. Haik stored 
the merchandise for them and they eventually transported it out of state to sell. 
The plan did not work well and the property became an albatross to the three. 
The son and son-in-law owed money to the defendant for rent but couldn't pay 
due to the advances given Haik. These facts were eventually conveyed to the 
defendant and he became angry and made threatening statements about Haik. 
An FBI informant (Samara) overheard some of the threatening statements about 
killing Haik and set up arrangement to record the statements via tape recordings 
with the FBI listening. The threatening statements were recorded and proceeded 
to trial. However, no money was paid and it was unclear whether Rahman 
wanted any physical harm to come to Haik. It was clear that he wanted his 
money. 
The Federal Court of Appeals dealt with a similar statute to Utah's, which 
required strongly corroborative circumstances that Rahman intended the hit man 
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(Henke) to extort and rob Haik of $60,000. The Court held that the government 
had to show that Rahman solicited, commanded, induced, or otherwise tried to 
persuade Henke to carry out the extortion and robbery. 
The Court held the evidence insufficient. The Court found that Rahman 
was angered by Haik's actions and belligerently voiced his ill will toward Haik. 
Henke, posing as a Mafia hit man, attempted to get Rahman to hire him to kill or 
rob Haik. Rahman spoke to Henke and sought to use Henke as a bill collector. 
Henke explained that he could only be hired to kill or maim Haik. 
Henke told Rahman that $2500 had to be paid up front for Henke to kill 
Haik. After that meeting, Rahman never contacted Samara or took any action to 
hire Henke. Two weeks later, Henke appeared and told Rahman that he had 
kidnapped Haik and retrieved the goods, on his own initiative. Rahman and his 
son were surprised that Henke had done anything since Rahman had neither 
spoken with Samara or Henke, nor had he paid the supposedly requisite up-
front money. Henke demanded payment and Rahman paid him. Rahman 
requested that Henke spare Haik's life, since they had paid Henke as requested. 
Money had even passed hands after the fact to Henke via Rahman. 
The Court held that the Government had failed to prove that Rahman 
intended and solicited Henke to rob and extort Haik. The Court concluded that 
even in the most favorable light given to the Government, there was scant 
evidence to show, let alone meet the statutory requirement to strongly 
corroborate, Brahmans intent to have Henke rob and extort Haik. The Court also 
found the evidence lacking that Rahman tried to induce Henke to carry out those 
crimes. 
PAG I? 
E 
CONCLUSION 
For the State to meet their burden of proof, they must exhibit evidence 
demonstrating that the defendant had the conscious desire or intent to follow 
through with each of the specified elements of this crime. He must desire the 
assault to have taken place. We do not and cannot presume his intent. We judge 
it only from objectively viewed conduct. 
There must be some element beyond mere verbal expression. The State 
must prove that there was some point in time at which the defendant had 
induced another to commit aggravated assault, with the intent to cause the 
commission of the crime and the defendant believing that the crime would take 
place. 
The evidence here is lacking. 
1) There was no agreement for a specific result (conduct). The ideas 
explored ranged from a violent death, death with a rape, a simple disappearance, 
an assault (turning her into a vegetable) or nothing—calling the whole thing off. 
2) Neither information nor payment was given to initiate any conduct. 
The information and money was a condition precedent to any conduct occurring. 
No photos, no money, no key were given. The best the prosecution has to offer is 
that the defendant gave a partial address. 
The Utah holdings would suggest that there must be something more than 
mere talk and the exploration of an idea. There must be some concrete course of 
action undertaken. Even preparatory stages of a crime are insufficient. One 
must take a substantial step under the "attempt" statute. Under the solicitation 
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statute, one must have an agreement to a concrete course of action intending a 
specific result. 
Here, the conversation did not go beyond simply talk. 
DATED this > < ^ day of July, 2001. 
SHEUDEN R CARTEI 
Attorney for Defendant 
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